forests are presented by different powerful groups as global goods in crisis (Myers 1992 , Ganzhorn et al. 2001 , Harper et al. 2007 , as wild natural spaces teeming with imperiled species of plants and animals (Myers et al. 2000 , Mittermeier et al. 2008 , as threatened suppliers of valuable ecosystem services (Laurance 1999 , Bodin et al. 2006 ) and as critical reserves of oil, titanium, and sequestered carbon that will facilitate national economic development and poverty alleviation if they can be managed sustainably (Norris 2006 , Reyneke and Wallmach 2007 , Ferguson 2009 people who produce for subsistence or who use extensive agricultural production strategies. In these narratives, Malagasy subsistence producers are represented in terms of a 'discourse of rurality' (Pratt 1996) , as a relatively homogenous class of causal agents whose generalized poverty, patterns of migration, inefficient modes of subsistence, and high birth rates are contributing to a "tragedy of the commons" scenario (Hardin 1968 , Durbin 1999 . According to these narratives, without significant environmental action the future will see progressive forest fragmentation, increased loss of habitats and endemic species, generalized ecosystem degradation, and ecological and economic collapse (Smith et al. 1997 , Coe 1998 , Hannah et al. 1998 : 30-31, Styger et al. 1999 : 258, Harper et al. 2007 positioned to both critically and empirically examine claims that on the surface may appear "common sense" (Herzfeld 1998 (Herzfeld , 2001 . Compelling and widely accepted claims, or "received wisdoms" can generalize complex processes and obscure "a complex political economy of winners and losers" (Leach and Mearns 1996: 442, Adger et al. 2001: 687-688) . By comparing local views and experience to the discourses that inform In the Masikoro and Vezo dialects of Malagasy, which are also spoken by Mikea, the word karaza means 'a type' (Astuti 1995b: 9) . There are karaza of all sorts of things: fruits (mangoes, oranges), animals (species), crops (varieties), and peoples According to local oral historians, contemporary Mikea, Vezo, and Masikoro share common heritage (Tucker 2003: 199) , and the emergence of Mikea, Vezo, and Masikoro identities was contemporaneous with the pre -colonial rise of the Maroseraña and Andrevola dynasties in southwest Madagascar in the seventeenth century (Yount et al. 2001 , Tucker 2003 . In the pre -colonial period, Masikoro identity became associated with "loyal, tribute -paying vassals to the kings" (Tucker et al. 2011: 293) .
Others sought to avoid political incorporation, risk of slave and cattle raids, frequent food shortages, and accusations of sorcery by resorting to mobile marine foraging, and to forest -based terrestrial foraging, herding, and farming (Tucker 2003: 199) . that itself has a Mikea history of life in the forest" (Yount et al. 2001: 262) . Thus, self -identification as Mikea may be processual, as discussed by Astuti (1995a, b) , but it may also be based in residential, historical, and/or genealogical explanations. In addition, most people who self -identify as Mikea also identify as Vezo or Masikoro, thereby alluding to personal histories, to livelihood diversification (discussed below), or historical migrations of particular groups of people. As Poyer and Kelly (2000: 168-169) observe, identities of self -identifying Mikea people may shift for various reasons, including avoidance of stigma or discrimination, as one moves between forest and villages.
Despite contemporary norms associating Mikea, Vezo, and Masikoro identities with ecologically specialized lifestyles, members of all three groups (and members of other groups as well) are highly mobile and practice "productive bricolage" livelihood strategies (Batterbury 2001: 483) . Throughout the twentieth century, Mikea and their neighbors responded ambitiously to market booms for butterbeans (kabaro) in the interwar period and the 1960s, silk (kohoke) harvesting and processing in the 1920s and again in the early 2000s, cotton (hasy), and maize (tsako) from the 1970s to the early 2000s (Ottino 1963 , Hoerner 1981 , 1987 , Tucker 2001 , Blanc -Pamard 2009 ). Even so, for most people, the majority of production has remained very diversified and subsistence -oriented or oriented toward regional markets. This is due to a combination of social, environmental, and economic factors, including seasonality, stochasticity of rainfall and markets, poor infrastructure resulting in high transport costs, dependency on relationships with brokers (often Malagasy Indo-Pakistani) who buy bulk produce at very low prices and sell high, the exploitive social relations of sharecropping, and the high debt -risk incurred by intensive agricultural production (see Ottino 1963 for early description).
In any given village residents are likely to practice a shifting combination of horticulture, animal husbandry, freshwater fishing, forest foraging, marine foraging, manufacturing, market commerce, and wage labor (Tucker 2001) .
THE EVOLUTION OF MIKEA FOREST ENVIRONMENTAL
GOVERNANCE. In recent years, interest in converting the Mikea Forest into a protected area (PA) and later a national park has been stimulated by national goals to increase the amount of forest under protection in Madagascar (Raik 2007) , and has been justified citing a significant reduction in regional forest cover since the 1970s due to forest cutting and burning for pasturage, charcoal production, and especially for hatsaky, swidden maize production, by subsistence farmers and agropastoralists (Seddon et al. 2000 , Milleville et al. 2001 , Aubry and Ramaromisy 2003 , Blanc -Pamard 2009 of Mikea origins. According to one stream of lore, Vazimba were a group of primordial inhabitants widely believed to have lived in the Malagasy highlands before being driven to peripheral areas of the island by later proto -Malagasy immigrants of "supe-rior… intellect and ability" (Grandidier 1920: 209 (Berg 1977 , Graeber 1999 , Tucker 2003 . According to Kelly and Poyer (1999) and to Tucker (2003) , with a lack of alternate written historical sources and little archaeological evidence, the some- (Birkeli 1920 , 1939 , Koechlin 1975 , Faroux and Rabedimy 1985 2 [discussion of "Les Mikea traditionnels"], Stiles 1991 , Godefroit 1998 : 83, Rarojo 1998 , Mouyon and Francelle 1999a , b, Blench 2008 . rights to non -discrimination, rights to special protection in order to safeguard culture, rights to consultation, and rights to free, prior and informed participation in political processes that affect them (Anaya 1991 , Bowen 2000 , Pelican 2009 ). considering that, although the names of particular ceremonies may vary by regional dialect, these are well -documented as common practices throughout the southwest, and throughout the whole of Madagascar (see Ottino 1963 , Bloch 1971 , Feeley-Harnik 1986 , Campbell 1992 , Astuti 1995a , Sharp 1995 , Lambek and Walsh 1997 , Lambek 1998 , Middleton 1999 , Cole 2001 , Dina 2001 , Emoff 2002 , Sirven 2006 , Graeber 2007 , Astuti and Harris 2008 , Tucker et al. 2011 ). Across the region, forest-based Mikea are stereotyped not as primitive or culturally distinct, but as very materially poor, as lacking basic education, as likely to possess only dirty or tattered clothing, and as likely to be dirty from a lifestyle that involves tuber digging or infrequent bathing (some forest villages and camps are located several kilometers from water sources).
Self
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People identifying as Mikea experience frequent discrimination and discuss difficulty earning fair wages for labor, being cheated in marketplace transactions, and being harassed by civil defense personnel. Mikea people are considered easy targets for bandits and corrupt outsiders who demand bribes because Mikea live in the forest or on the social margins of villages, often lack up-todate passports and licenses, and have relatively little access to legal protection (Tucker et al. 2011: 300) .
The hatsaky maize ban has been particularly problematic for many Mikea living within the forest. Direct effects include the elimination for many of their largest source of cash income, and greatly reduced access to the most nutritious non -foraged staple food. People living across the region frequently attribute increased crime incidence with the crack -down on maize production, as some people (primarily young men from hard- markets for seed, agricultural inputs, and agricultural outputs;
reliable water sources for irrigation, and access to public services, including transportation, education, health services, and agricultural extensions (Zeller et al. 2000: 10, Dear and McCool 2010: 106-107 ).
In regional environmental policies, particular discourses of what Lambek (1998: 106) terms "historicity." The implication is that people who become foragers culturally devolve (Lee and Hitchcock 2001: 267) , and step out of history into a more "authentic" (Wilmsen 1989: 8) social order that is less dynamic and more natural. The foraging mode of subsistence is presented as ahistorical, equated with isolation not only from cities, infrastructure or broader social institutions, but with "remoteness from the flow of history" itself (Wilmsen 1989: 8 (Bowen 2000) . The stated ethical intent of a rule like OD 4.20 is to ensure that particular groups of people, be they 'indigenous peoples', ethnic minorities, or other groups whose social or economic status has historically restricted their ability to assert their interests and rights to land and other productive resources, are afforded special protections to avoid increased vulnerability disadvantage in the development process (World Bank 1991 Park in order to define legitimate claims to land and resources (Neumann 1997: 561) . Issues related to the representation of 'communities' are not just a matter of abstract or academic interest; they are inevitably linked to problems and questions in the domains of policy and practice (Brosius et al. 1998: 165) .
Discourses represent knowledge regimes from which policy prescriptions and action flow (Adger et al. 2001: 684) , and they connect knowledge and actions of agents on multiple scales of interaction. Different actors employ compelling policy narratives and discourses for different purposes, and explanations of environmental, social, and demographic change that become integrated into policy are likely to be those put forward by relatively powerful stakeholders (Kull 2002) .
Because Malagasy people living in rural localities may have limited means to counter dominant narratives or participate fully in policy discussions, stakeholders possessing greater social power shape the context in which discussions about environmental governance and rights take place, can specify who is qualified to make decisions about environmental management, and can frame problems so that certain courses of action are justified while a variety of alternative perspectives and courses of action are never considered (Brosius 1999 : 278, Kull 2002 . These processes carry profound practical implications in terms of human well-being in the context of regional conservation and development projects, and for environmental futures in the Mikea Forest region and throughout Madagascar.
International norms for indigenous human rights claim universal applicability (Bowen 2000) , but the concept of 'indigenous peoples' is highly politicized, and is subject to local and national particularities (Pelican 2009: 53) . Identifying who qualifies as indigenous can be problematic, especially when these categories are not meaningful to the people who are objects of policy action. Such problems are exacerbated when procedures for achieving free, prior, and informed consent for conservation and development projects are conceptually and logistically challenging to practitioners on the ground (Bowen 2000 , Colchester and Ferrari 2007 , Pelican 2009 ). They contribute to significant gaps among prescribed policy, realized legislation and protocols, and micro-regional conservation and development practice. This risks widening gaps between anticipated results (in terms of social outcomes, and for landscape and biodiversity preservation) and realized local outcomes for particular projects.
Rather than empowering people to "negotiate on equal terms with project proponents" as is the intent of guidelines such as World Bank Operational Directive 4.20 (Goodland 2004: 66) 
